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Stereotyping and Difference:
Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Future
of Sex Discrimination Law
David H. Gans
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
holding of Roe v. Wade2 that the Constitution protects a woman's right to
choose abortion before fetal viability. But the Casey joint opinion3 based its
holding not only on the right to privacy recognized in Roe, but also on
principles of sex equality. Many scholars have recognized the significant
equality themes that run through the Casey joint opinion."
Casey's recognition of the sex discrimination inherent in restrictive
abortion laws highlights the paradox of modem sex discrimination law under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court has invalidated statutes under
the Equal Protection Clause based on the sort of role typing condemned by the
Casey joint opinion,- the Equal Protection Clause does not provide any
protection against restrictive abortion laws.6 Indeed, abortion laws fall outside
equal protection analysis even while the Court claims that the central purpose
1. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. The lead opinion in Casey was a joint opinion coauthored by Justices O'Connor. Kennedy and
Souter. Justices Stevens and Blackmun joined the portions of the joint opinion reaffirming Roe and
invalidating Pennsylvania's husband-notification statute.
4. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 1185. 1199-1200
(1992).
5. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
6. See CAss R. SUNSTN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITTION 284 (1993).
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of its sex discrimination jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause is to
prohibit states from enacting laws based on stereotypical notions of women's
proper roles. This Note explores this contradiction, examining how the
Supreme Court reasons about stereotyping in the area of reproductive
differences, and attempts to use the opinion in Casey to suggest a fuller
concept of stereotyping and equal protection analysis.
Part I of this Note examines the centrality of stereotyping analysis to
modem sex discrimination law under the Equal Protection Clause, noting
especially the Court's understanding of stereotypes and the harms that flow
from them. Part II looks at the doctrinal structure of stereotyping analysis,
focusing on how the Court's narrow definition of sex-based classifications
mediates the stereotyping inquiry. This Part then looks at equal protection
cases involving women's reproductive capacity. In some cases, the Court,
without conducting its stereotyping analysis, upholds statutes that discriminate
against pregnant women. In other cases, the Court adopts a narrow
understanding of stereotyping, limited to a failure to recognize similarities
between men and women. This narrow definition does not cover stereotypical
judgments about the proper roles of women when they are based on biological
differences between the sexes.
Arguing from the historical treatment of women's reproductive differences,
Part I suggests that harmful stereotyping has occurred and still occurs where
men and women are not similarly situated. This Part examines the Court's
decision in Casey and the different understanding of stereotyping we see in the
joint opinion. It concludes by formulating a model of equal protection analysis
based on the Casey joint opinion's equality analysis. Part IV applies the model
suggested above to pregnancy discrimination and restrictive abortion laws.
Finally, it suggests how we might rethink the comparison principle at the heart
of equal protection law to produce a fuller understanding of equality in the
context of sex differences.
I. STEREOTYPING AS THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW
Stereotyping is the central evil that the Court's equal protection doctrine
seeks to prevent. Indeed, the Court has described the harm of sex-based
classification in terms of stereotypes about the proper roles of women. As
Justice Brennan explained in Orr v. Orr, "Legislative classifications which
distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk
of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need
for special protection."7 In evaluating constitutional challenges to laws that
7. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419,
1424-25 (1994) (recognizing that heightened scrutiny of gender-based classifications is necessary because
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discriminate based on sex, the Supreme Court has consistently held that state
laws and practices reflecting stereotypical assumptions about women's proper
roles are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.'
Before examining the Court's decisions in this area, it will be useful to
develop an understanding of the psychological concept of stereotyping.
Stereotyping is a part of the normal process of categorization. 9 In a world too
complex to know first hand, people need a way to simplify and organize.
Stereotypes serve this function. As Walter Lippmann observed, stereotypes are
the "pictures in our heads" that allow us to make sense of a world "with so
much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations.""0
In categorizing the world, stereotypes describe the characteristics and
personality traits that belong to individuals in a social group. For example, sex
stereotypes describe men as strong, aggressive, and independent, women as
passive, nurturing, and dependent." These claims about men's and women's
natures, like stereotypes about other groups, "often are overgeneralizations and
are either inaccurate or do not apply to the individual" in question."
Stereotypes also identify the expected patterns of behavior for a particular
social group. Sex-role stereotypes specify the behaviors that are appropriate for
men and for women. 13 These stereotypes define the proper roles of men and
women not by reference to individuals' personality traits, but by the type of
conduct desirable for each sex. While sex stereotyping makes an empirical
generalization about the sexes, sex-role stereotyping is based on normative
assumptions about the proper roles of men and women."
The Supreme Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence recognizes both
sorts of stereotyping identified in the psychological literature: empirical
generalizations and normative assumptions about the proper roles of women.'5
of "real danger that government policies that professedly are based on reasonable considerations in fact may
be reflective of 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations about gender or based on 'outdated misconceptions
concerning the role of females in the home rather than in the marketplace and world of ideas.'- (citatons
omitted)).
8. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422; Califano v. Westcott. 443 U.S. 76. 89 (1979): Orr, 440 U.S. at
279-80; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977) (plurality opinion).
9. See Shelley E. Taylor, A Categorization Approach to Stereotyping, in COGNmVE PROCESSES IX
STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 83. 84-85 (David L Hamilton ed.. 1981) (hereinafter
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPINGI.
10. WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 3, 11 (1922); see also Madeline E. Heilman. Sex Bias in
Work Settings, in 5 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 269. 271 (LL Cummings & Barry St. Staw
eds., 1983) (describing stereotypes as "a set of attributes ascribed to a group and imputed to its individual
members simply because they belong to that group").
11. See Heilman, supra note 10. at 272.
12. 1d. at 271 (emphasis omitted).
13. For a discussion of the difference between sex stereotypes and sex-role stereotypes, see Diana N.
Ruble & Thomas L. Ruble, Sex Stereotypes, in IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: CONTIEMPORARY ISSUES
IN STEREOTYPING 188, 194 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 1982) [hereinafter IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER].
14. See Richard D. Ashmore & Frances K. Del Boca, Conceptual Approaches to Stereotypes and
Stereotyping, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING. supra note 9. at 1. 21; James R Terborg. Women
in Management, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL 647, 650 (1977).
15. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
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For example, the Court condemned a policy based on normative assumptions
about the proper roles of women in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan.'6 In Hogan, the Court invalidated a state nursing school's policy of
excluding men from admission because the policy "reflect[ed] archaic and
stereotypic notions" of the "proper roles of men and women."'7 The Court
rejected the argument that the exclusion of men was necessary to compensate
for discriminatory barriers faced by women, finding instead that the
university's admission policy "perpetuate[d] the stereotyped view of nursing
as an exclusively women's job."' 8
The Hogan Court noted that the nursing school's assumptions about the
proper roles of women harmed the women who conformed to those
assumptions by depressing the wages paid to nurses.' 9 The Court also
recognized the broader harms to women caused by stereotyping. It recognized
that government policies based on stereotypes about women's proper roles are
unjust-not only to women who do not fit the particular stereotype, but to all
women-because they convert stereotypical assumptions about women's proper
roles into reality, forcing women into constricted social roles. As Justice
O'Connor explained, by excluding males from admission, the nursing school
policy made the "assumption that nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
20
The link between empirical generalizations and normative assumptions
about the proper roles of women is critical to understanding why the Court has
found laws based on empirical generalizations about women to violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Empirical generalizations occur frequently in
legislation; indeed, as John Hart Ely has noted, such generalizations are an
essential part of legislation.21 The Equal Protection Clause, in most cases,
does not prohibit the use of such generalizations in creating laws.22 In the
area of sex stereotyping, however, statutes based on inaccurate generalizations
about the roles and abilities of men and women are unconstitutional because
these generalizations perpetuate offensive normative assumptions about
women's proper roles.23
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 355-56 (1992).
16. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
17. Id. at 725, 726.
18. Id. at 729.
19. d at 729-30 & n.15.
20. Id. at 730.
21. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST 156 (1980); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that requirement that legislature
provide individualized determinations in drawing statutory classifications is "nothing less than an attack
upon the very notion of lawmaking itself").
22. See Whilliamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
23. This is true even where a generalization reflects a substantial measure of truth. As the Court
recently noted, "gender classifications that rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection
Clause, even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization." J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B., 114 S. CL 1419, 1427 n.II (1994).
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For example, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld," the Court invalidated a
statute that provided to a widow and her children Social Security benefits
based on the earnings of a deceased husband, but denied to the widower
benefits based on the earnings of his deceased wife. The provision was invalid
because it rested on the "overbroad generalization" that women, but not men,
are dependent on the wages earned by their spouses. 5 Yet, as the facts of the
Weinberger case show, women's wage-earning work can be absolutely vital to
a family's efforts to live a decent life. By labeling wives as dependents and
husbands as breadwinners, Congress perpetuated the stereotype of female
dependency, reinforcing the notion that men, not women, should be the
primary wage earners for a family.
Weinberger demonstrates the necessary connection between assumptions
about what women are and assumptions about what women should be.
Judgments about the traits possessed by women reinforce notions about what
the proper roles of women should be, making stereotypical judgments about
women's roles and abilities into self-fulfilling prophecies. Legislation that rests
on such stereotypical notions about the proper roles of women is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because it "reinforce[s] ...
stereotypes about the group's competence or predispositions that have been
used to prevent them from voting, participating on juries, pursuing their chosen
professions, or otherwise contributing to civic life." 6 At the core of the
prohibition on stereotyping, then, is the notion that state practices and policies
based on stereotypes block women's choice of social roles, preventing them
from fully taking part in American society. Such policies are inconsistent with
the notion of equal citizenship at the core of the Equal Protection Clause. -
This link between overbroad generalizations and women's roles explains why
the Court's stereotyping analysis is not simply an across-the-board attack on
the "inevitable stuff of legislation."'
The Supreme Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence, however, analyzes
inaccurate and overbroad generalizations in terms of similarities between the
sexes. The Court only invalidates legislation based on impermissible
stereotyping when the stereotyping involves a failure to recognize similarities
between men and women. For example, in Weinberger, by failing to recognize
that both men and women could be the primary wage earners for a household,
the statute provided "'dissimilar treatment for men and women who are..
24. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
25. Id. at 643.
26. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.14; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.. 473 U.S.
432, 440-41 (1985) ("'[W]hat differentiates sex from... nonsuspect statuses ... is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." (quoting Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion))).
27. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1. 23-26, 55 (1977).
28. ELY, supra note 21, at 156.
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similarly situated"' in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.29 Under the
Court's current doctrine, the "harm of stereotyping," Catharine MacKinnon has
noted, is the assumption that "all women are the same and/or like some mythic
feminine standard, and inherently and irredeemably different from men.""
This focus on sameness versus difference underlies the problems in the
Supreme Court's understanding of stereotyping. Stereotyping is not simply
reducible to a failure to recognize similarities between the sexes. Psychologists
have defined stereotypes as a set of beliefs about a group's personal
attributes-both personality traits and norms of expected behavior;3 they
have not focused on issues of sameness and difference. Moreover,
psychologists have suggested that aspects of an "individual's physiological or
biological identity" are often the stimuli for stereotypical judgments. 2 This
is especially true in the area of sex and sex-role stereotyping, where
stereotypes are generally based on "assumed or perceived sex differences."33
Consequently, any stereotyping inquiry should not focus solely on the
biological similarities or differences between men and women. Rather, courts
should scrutinize statutes to see if they are based on generalizations about the
roles and abilities of women and normative expectations about appropriate
behavior for women.
The Supreme Court's sameness/difference framework allows the state to
perpetuate outmoded notions about women's proper roles where men and
women are different. Women's differences from men do not dictate their social
roles. As Ann Freedman has explained, it is "social arrangements and not
biology that give[] [sex differences] meaning.... [P]articular human
characteristics have no inherent social significance, and no social arrangements
concerning sex differences are 'natural' rather than culturally determined."'
Rather, society constructs women's roles precisely in terms of their differences
from men.35 The Court has never recognized this point because sex
29. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 653 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)); see also Vicki
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work- Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in 71tle V71 Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1806 (1990)
(equating stereotyping analysis with "familiar principle that likes are to be treated alike").
30. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281, 1292
(1991); see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1004 (1984)
("The prevailing sex equality standard determines whether the sex-based classification at issue actually is
responsive to real differences between men and women and rejects classifications when there are no such
differences.").
31. See Ashmore & Del Boca, supra note 14, at 21; supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
32. Arthur G. Miller, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Stereotyping, in IN THE EYE OF
THE BEHOLDER, supra note 13, at 1, 29.
33. See Ashmore & Del Boca, supra note 14, at 20.
34. Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 945
(1983).
35. See MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 1290 ("Society defines women as such according to differences
from men: hence the sex difference, as gender is customarily termed.").
1880 [Vol. 104: 1875
Stereotyping and Difference
discrimination law is structured to avoid looking at stereotyping where there
are categorical sex differences between men and women.6
II. STEREOTYPING AND THE STRUCTURE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW
A. The Structure of Stereotyping Analysis
Despite the centrality of stereotyping analysis to the Supreme Court's
modem sex discrimination jurisprudence, the Court does not look for
stereotyping in deciding whether to apply the heightened scrutiny standard of
Craig v. Boren.37 Instead, the Court looks for a sex-based classification; 
3
it applies heightened scrutiny only if the challenged law divides those affected
by the statute into two groups, one composed solely of men and the other
solely of women. The Court asks whether a statute rests on stereotypes only
after determining that a statute creates a sex-based distinction and only in
evaluating whether the state interests are sufficient to justify a sex-
discriminatory law. If either the state interests or the means used to achieve
them reflect stereotypical assumptions about women's proper roles, the statute
cannot pass constitutional muster.
We can see the structure of the Court's stereotyping analysis most clearly
in Hogan. The first inquiry in any sex discrimination case brought under the
Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged policy "discriminates...
on the basis of gender."3 9 Writing for the Hogan Court, Justice O'Connor
compared the position of the plaintiff (in this case a male) with that of a
"similarly situated female,"' a finding that the state nursing school's policy
created a sex-based classification. The Court proceeded to ask whether the
discriminatory policy served "'important governmental objectives""'s and
whether the discriminatory means employed were "'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."', 42 In conducting this inquiry, the Court
examined the interests the state actually sought to achieve and questioned
whether they rested on stereotypes about women's proper roles.43
The Court first looked to see if the goals of the statute rested on
normatively offensive assumptions about women's proper roles. As the Court
explained, the Craig standard
36. Within this category of differences are those that define what it means to be female and male, such
as biological characteristics associated with sexuality and reproduction. See Freedman. supra note 34.
at 923.
37. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
38. Id. at 197.
39. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718. 723 (1982).
40. Id. at 723 n.8.
41. Id. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142. 150 (1980)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 728-30 (analyzing actual purpose of challenged statute).
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must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities
of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the
statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus,
if the statutory objective is to exclude or "protect" members of one
gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap
or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate."
Finding that the actual purpose of the nursing school policy was to maintain
nursing as a women's profession, the Court invalidated the policy because this
goal rested on a stereotypical vision of women's roles.
Stereotyping analysis also informed the Court's means-ends inquiry. A
substantial relationship between the discriminatory classification and the state's
goals is necessary "to assure that the validity of a classification is determined
through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and
women."4s At this stage of the analysis, the Court examined the connection
between means and ends in an effort to make sure that the means by which the
state has tried to advance its legitimate interests do not reflect overbroad
generalizations and assumptions about women's roles. Finding that the nursing
school permitted men to audit classes, the Court concluded that the school
policy did not further legitimate educational goals.46 Rather, it perpetuated
constitutionally illegitimate notions about women's proper roles.
The Supreme Court's current sex discrimination analysis merely relies on
stereotyping as a means of smoking out unconstitutional sex discrimination. A
female plaintiff must prove that a statute treats all men differently from all
women before the Court will inquire whether the state policy rests on
stereotypical notions of women's roles. The comparison principle thus serves
as a gatekeeper to the stereotyping analysis. In cases like Hogan, this structure
is not problematic. Because the state policy explicitly provided differential
treatment for all men and all women, the Court applied heightened scrutiny
and invalidated the policy as having rested on the stereotype that nursing is a
profession for women only.
47
B. Stereotyping and Difference
1. The Structure of Sex Discrimination Law
Where there are categorical sex differences between men and women,
however, the structure of sex discrimination law breaks down and serves only
44. Id. at 724-25.
45. Id. at 725-26.
46. Id. at 730-31.
47. See Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to
Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REv. 265, 296 (1984).
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to obscure how state laws perpetuate and reinforce stereotypes about the proper
roles of women. As Herma Hill Kay has noted, 'The existence of physical
sexual reproductive differences and the pervasive social system of ascribed
sexual characteristics derived from those differences frequently makes cross-
sex comparisons impossible or inaccurate. '4" The trouble is not that courts are
unable to recognize how the law treats men and women differently, but that
the comparison principle prevents courts from scrutinizing legislation that
regulates women's conduct in areas, such as reproduction, where men and
women are biologically different.
Consider Geduldig v. Aiello,49 in which the Court upheld the exclusion
of pregnancy-related disabilities from a state disability insurance system.
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court found that the pregnancy exclusion was
not discriminatory because, under the insurance program, "[t]here is no risk
from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk
from which women are protected and men are not."0 Significantly, the Court
justified its refusal to scrutinize a measure whose total impact fell on women
by emphasizing the essential physicality of pregnancy:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not
follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a
sex-based classification like those considered in Reed [v. Reed] and
Frontiero [v. Richardson]. Normal pregnancy is an objectively
identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a
showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of
one sex . . . , lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude
pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any
reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical
condition.5'
The Geduldig Court analyzed pregnancy-based classifications as if
pregnancy were merely a physical condition appearing in only one sex. Under
this analysis, the Court stripped the ability to become pregnant of any social
meaning, ignoring the ways in which the legal treatment of pregnancy defines
the appropriate roles of women and, consequently, dictates women's place in
society. The baseline for the comparison is what men have; equal protection
doctrine protects women only to the extent that they seek to be treated like
48. Herma Hill Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 39. 78-79.
49. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
50. Id. at 496-97. Focusing on the terms of the program's classification. the Cout found that the
program "divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While
the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial
benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes." Id. at 496 n.20.
51. Id. at 496 n.20.
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men." Catharine MacKinnon's critique of the comparison principle applies
with full force. "Unquestioned is how difference is socially created or defined,
who sets the point of reference for sameness, or the comparative empirical
approach itself. '53 Because the Court treated pregnancy solely as a matter of
biology, it failed to see how the state transformed a biological difference
between men and women into a social disadvantage for pregnant women. Thus,
the Court mystified the existence of stereotypical judgments in pregnancy-
based legislative classifications.54
Pregnancy is a uniquely female physical condition. Because the Court's
comparison principle mediates the sex discrimination analysis, this is the only
important fact. The analysis ends with the recognition of the pregnancy
difference between the sexes, and the Court never applies the stereotyping
analysis developed in cases like Hogan. Since pregnancy is not something that
happens to men, making distinctions based on pregnancy does not constitute
sex discrimination and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Similar reasoning about sex discrimination and stereotyping appears in
Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board.5 Cohen involved a constitutional
challenge to a school board regulation requiring pregnant teachers to go on
maternity leave at the end of the fifth month of pregnancy.56 In rejecting a
pregnant teacher's claim that the forced pregnancy leave policy discriminated
against women, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reasoned that the regulation did not create a sex-based classification because
it "does not apply to women in an area in which they may compete with
men. 57 Emphasizing that pregnancy is simply a physical condition, the court
explained:
The fact that only women experience pregnancy and motherhood
removes all possibility of competition between the sexes in this area.
No man-made law or regulation excludes males from those
experiences, and no such laws or regulations can relieve females from
all of the burdens which naturally accompany the joys and blessings
of motherhood .... The disabilities and preoccupations of maternity
are visited but slightly upon the father ... [I]t is she who must
52. See StNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 284-85; Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the
Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 58 (1990).
53. MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 1287.
54. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1546, 1555 (1991); Siegel, supra
note 15, at 269-70; cf Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 37-52 (1991) (criticizing the Court's use of formal concept of race that sees race as attribute with no
social meaning). Following Gotanda, we might call the Court's treatment of pregnancy "formal-pregnancy."
55. 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
56. A teacher could not return to work without providing assurances that care of her child would cause
little interference with her job. The regulation also required written notice from a doctor that the teacher
was physically fit to work full-time. Cohen, 474 F.2d at 396 n.2.
57. Id. at 397.
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shoulder the principal problems of pregnancy, the labors of childbirth
and the care and feeding of the child in the early months of its life.S
According to the court, invidious sex-based discrimination only occurs "in
situations in which the sexes are in actual or potential competition."59 To use
the court's example, because both men and women can serve as administrators
for an estate, a statute preferring the appointment of men to women is
invidiously discriminatory.60 Under the court's definition, the state can only
discriminate against women by failing to recognize similarities between men
and women.
Underlying the court's opinion is the notion that the "impact of sex
differences on people's lives is natural and inevitable, rather than culturally
determined.' Judge Haynsworth failed to see the pregnancy leave policy as
discriminatory because, to him, biology is destiny. Government regulations
recognizing the differences that result from women's childbearing capacity
cannot be invalidated as discriminatory because they only recognize the clear
facts of biology: Women's role is to bear and rear children. Thus, to Judge
Haynsworth, the school board's forced leave policy had no social meaning
independent of biology. It implied nothing about women's proper roles.
Similar reasoning appears in the Supreme Court's treatment of abortion.
Like pregnancy, the decision to obtain an abortion is an act full of social
meaning in American society.62 Nonetheless, the Court has often analyzed the
act of abortion as a question involving physical facts about pregnant women's
bodies rather than social issues about compelled motherhood and women's
roles in American society.
For example, in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 63 the Court,
relying on its equal protection cases, held that the practice of blockading
58. Id. at 397-98. The majority added that if the forced pregnancy leave policy were a sex-based
classification, sex-specific statutory rape laws, military regulations requiring men to be clean-shaven, and
regulations requiring women, but not men, to keep their breasts covered at beaches would also be examples
of sex-based discrimination, Id. at 397. All of these examples emphasize the differences between men's
and women's bodies and suggest that equal protection scrutiny should be minimal, if not nonexistent. where
bodily differences exist. The Court did not, however, recognize the socially constructed nature of these
differences. See People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232, 236-37 (N.Y. 1992) (Titone, J.. concurring) (arguing
that statute prohibiting public exposure of women's, but not men's, breasts reinforces archaic stereotypes
about women's bodies).
59. Cohen, 474 F.2d at 397.
60. Id. (discussing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). Under this reasoning, the forced leave policy
might have been discriminatory in forcing the plaintiff to leave work even when her ability to teach was
the same as any male teacher. The court did not consider this argument.
61. Freedman, supra note 34, at 945.
62. See CARROLL SMITH-RosENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN
AMERICA 217 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986) (1985) ("[The abortion issue raises concerns abouti the
acceptability of woman's participation in the economy, and, more broadly, woman's appropriate role within
the home and society. It exemplifies political control of the personal and physiological.").
63. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). Bray did not involve an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause;
rather, it presented the question of whether abortion clinic blockades were actionable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1988).
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abortion clinics and preventing all women from obtaining medical services did
not constitute the "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus"' necessary
to prove a violation of the deprivation clause of § 1985(3).65
In a now-familiar move, the Court emphasized physical facts about
women's bodies to explain why the blockaders had no discriminatory animus.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court found that the requisite animus was not
present because the blockaders did not have a purpose that "focuse[d] upon
women by reason of their sex."' Ignoring the fact that the fetus cannot be
separated from the pregnant woman carrying it, the Court found that the
purpose of the blockade was not "directed specifically at women as a class,"'67
but rather was a neutral attempt to save fetal life. As the Court explained, the
clinic blockaders "define their 'rescues' not with reference to women, but as
physical intervention 'between abortionists and the innocent victims."'"8 Thus,
the Court found that there was no discriminatory animus because the anti-
abortion blockaders sought to save fetuses, not to harm women.
In reversing the affirmance of a preliminary injunction, the Court treated
the blockades as benign exercises in saving fetal life that implied nothing about
women's social roles in American society. It never once considered whether
the blockades reflected and perpetuated stereotypical notions about women's
proper roles. As Justice Scalia conceptualized the issue for the majority, the
blockaders' great desire to save fetuses meant that women's equality was not
at issue.69 The Court did not consider whether the blockaders' desire to save
fetuses reflected their views about women's roles as mothers or, if not,
whether the blockaders were motivated by stereotypes about women's proper
roles as well as by their concern for fetuses. To the Court, massive blockades
seeking to prevent women from making medical decisions have no social
meaning for women's equality. As in Geduldig, it is only an issue of biology.
Under Bray, sex discrimination only arises when a conspiracy "focuses
upon women by reason of their sex."'70 To use Justice Scalia's example, a
conspiracy to prevent women from becoming lawyers would meet this
requirement because such a conspiracy would attempt to "'sav[e]' women
because they are women from a combative, aggressive profession such as the
practice of law."'71 Where women are the same as men, as in the ability to
practice law, Justice Scalia recognizes the sex-based character of the
64. 113 S. Ct. at 759 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
65. Id. at 759-62.
66. Id. at 759.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 759-60 (quoting NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
69. As Justice Scalia noted, "Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be denied that there are
common and respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of or condescension toward (or indeed
any view at all concerning) women as a class .... Id. at 760.
70. Id. at 759.
71. Id.
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discrimination. Yet, where there is some physical difference between the sexes,
such as the ability to be pregnant and carry a fetus, conspiracies that target
women because of these sex-linked physical characteristics are sex-neutral. The
Court in Bray once again maps issues of sameness and difference onto the
definition of sex equality: Sex discrimination can only occur when the law fails
to recognize similarities between men and women.
2. Defining Stereotyping
Distorting its sex discrimination analysis still further, the Supreme Court
has also adopted a very narrow definition of stereotyping, defining it out of
existence where there are categorical sex differences between men and women.
State laws that classify based on the capacity to become pregnant are subject
to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because they
distinguish, on their face, between all men and all women, thereby creating a
sex-based classification.72 In such cases, the Court's stereotyping analysis
must be applied. Yet, the Supreme Court, while purporting to apply heightened
scrutiny, has in fact given little scrutiny to such laws. Instead, the Court has
diluted the anti-stereotyping principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause
by defining stereotyping as a failure to recognize similarities between men and
women. This definition negates the possibility of stereotyping when the state
legislates in an area, such as reproductive capacity, where men and women are
different.
For example, in Michael M. v. Superior Court,73 the Supreme Court
upheld a California statutory rape law that made only men criminally liable for
the act of sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of eighteen. Even
under the reasoning of Geduldig and its progeny, this was clearly a sex-based
classification. If a man and a woman, both under the age of eighteen, have
sexual intercourse, only the man is criminally liable. 74 In upholding the sex-
based statutory rape law, then Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion synthesized
the Court's cases dealing with stereotyping and sex discrimination, explaining
that these decisions stood for the "principle that a legislature may not 'make
overbroad generalizations based on sex which are entirely unrelated to any
differences between men and women or which demean the ability or social
status of the affected class."'
75
72. Such classifications are contrasted with the type at issue in Geduldig and Cohen, where the
government subjected pregnant women to differential treatment based on their pregnancy.
73. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
74. Id. at 466 (plurality opinion); id. at 476 (Stewart, J.. concurring); id at 488 (Brennan. J..
dissenting); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONS'TrIrONAL LAW § 16-28. at 1575 (2d ed.
1988).
75. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (quoting Parham v. Hughes. 441 U.S. 347. 354 (1979) (plurality
opinion)). The Court never considered whether the law demeaned women. Nor has the Court ever applied
this highly subjective standard in any other sex discrimination case.
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Stereotyping, in the plurality's view, cannot occur where men and women
are not similarly situated. Stereotyping only exists where the state fails to
recognize similarities between men and women. This definition of stereotyping
adopts the reasoning about biological difference that we saw in Geduldig,
Cohen, and Bray: Discrimination against women because of their capacity to
become pregnant does not implicate women's equality since such regulation
is based on the sexes' different physical states, not on social judgments about
women's roles and abilities.
Having found no possibility of stereotyping in cases where there are
categorical differences between men and women, the plurality proceeded to
build a standard of review based on these differences. Instead of the
intermediate standard of review of sex-based classifications established in
Craig v. Boren,76 Justice Rehnquist applied an analysis that would permit any
state legislation that classifies based on sex where the statute "realistically
reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain
circumstances."" With this "similarly situated" analysis, the plurality
reintroduced the same formal conception of pregnancy operating in Geduldig,
Cohen, and Bray.
Upholding the law as a measure designed to combat teenage pregnancy,
the plurality found that, because only women have the capacity to become
pregnant, a statute punishing men, but not women, for the crime of statutory
rape did not rest on stereotypical reasoning. As Justice Rehnquist explained:
Because virtually all the significant harmful ... consequences of
teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, a legislature acts well
within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who,
by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct .... [T]he
risk of pregnancy ... constitutes a substantial deterrence to young
females. No similar natural sanctions deter males. A criminal sanction
imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly "equalize" the
deterrents on the sexes.78
This passage reproduces stereotypical reasoning while denying its presence. If
men are not aggressors in sex, why is there any need to provide an additional
deterrent for them? According to the plurality's analysis, the statute does not
reflect stereotypes; the facts of reproductive biology make men the aggressors.
Women, "by nature," have a built-in deterrent to sex; men do not. Under the
plurality's analysis, stereotyping cannot occur where men and women are
76. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
77. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469; see also Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections
on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RE, 175, 182 n.50 (1982) (criticizing Justice
Rehnquist's analysis in Michael M. for failing to apply established intermediate scrutiny test).
78. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473.
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different. This analysis denies all social meaning attached to women's capacity
to become pregnant.
Ell. RETHINKING STEREOTYPING AND DIFFERENCE
The Supreme Court's stereotyping analysis badly needs a change in focus.
Strong judicial language condemning stereotypes about women has suggested
that the Court, through the prohibition on stereotyping, has cleansed the statute
books of laws that perpetuate stereotypic notions about women and men. In
creating this image, but not this reality, the Court has legitimated sex
discrimination. To correct these problems, the Court needs a fuller
understanding of stereotypes, one that will dissolve the linkages between
stereotyping and sameness.
A. The Lessons of History
Examining the Supreme Court's sex discrimination analysis under the
Equal Protection Clause from a historical perspective illustrates the flaws
inherent in the modem Court's equal protection analysis. The Court's refusal
to examine the way society constructs women's biological differences from
men parallels the Supreme Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In that era, the Court upheld explicitly
sex-based restrictions on women's ability to participate in a wide range of
activities on the grounds that women's biological differences from men
confined them to particular roles. In that era, as today, the Court refused to
look at the socially constructed nature of these differences. As a result, states
excluded women from civic life in a variety of areas, reasoning that their
childbearing capacity required them to be mothers, not civic participants.
In recognizing the authority of states to bar women from becoming
lawyers, Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois79 exemplifies
the late nineteenth-century Supreme Court's view that women's capacity to
bear children destined them to lead lives exclusively in the sphere of home and
family:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
79. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
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sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood....
... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general
constitution of things .... 'o
The Supreme Court also upheld discriminatory labor laws that imposed
strict limitations on women's, but not men's, work outside the home. For
example, in Muller v. Oregon,8 the Supreme Court upheld a law setting the
maximum hours a woman could work outside the home. Although a sex-
neutral maximum-hour law had been invalidated in Lochner v. New York,
82
the Court upheld the law, finding that a woman's
physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal
functions-having in view not merely her own health, but the well-
being of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as
well as the passion of man .... The two sexes differ in structure of
body, in the functions to be performed by each .. 83
The Supreme Court also relied on biological differences between the sexes
to justify women's exclusion from civic obligations. The Court upheld the
exemption of women from jury duty on the grounds that "woman is still
regarded as the center of home and family life."' Similarly, the Court upheld
a statute exempting women, along with blind persons, from the payment of a
poll tax. Yet, women, unlike the blind, could qualify for this exemption only
if they did not register to vote. In Breedlove v. Suttles, the Court upheld this
form of state discouragement of women's political participation, finding that
the "burdens necessarily borne by [women] for the preservation of the race"
made it permissible for the state to discourage them from voting.85
80. Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring). Following Bradwell, states barred women from the practice
of law and other professions because of the belief that a woman's duty was to bear children. See ALICE
KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 185-86
(1982) (discussing professions that were closed to women around turn of century).
81. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding Oregon statute limiting working hours for female laundromat
employees).
82. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down statute setting maximum hours for bakery employees).
83. Muller, 208 U.S. at 422; see also Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924) (upholding
legislation barring women from night jobs based on need to prevent impairment of women's "peculiar and
natural functions"). The protective labor laws upheld in these cases helped to create a sex-segregated labor
market, forcing women to take "lower paid, less desirable jobs" or to stay at home. See Law, supra note
30, at 959 n.14; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace:
Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2173 (1994) (noting that these
protective labor laws imposed added costs on employers hiring women workers).
84. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419,
1422-23 (1994) (discussing historical justifications for barring women from serving on juries).
85. 302 U.S. 277, 282 (1937); see also Law, supra note 30, at 958 n.13.
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Other statutes of the late nineteenth century that reflected similar notions
about women's proper roles never reached the courts. For example, states
compelled women to be mothers through legislation criminalizing abortions.
The physicians leading the campaign to criminalize abortion voiced the same
stereotypical notions that animated the Court in Bradvell, justifying abortion
bans on the grounds that "the chief purpose of women was to produce
children; anything that interfered with that purpose, or allowed women to
'indulge' themselves in less important activities, threatened ... the future of
society itself. Abortion was a supreme example of such an interference.""
This history illustrates the importance of looking at the social meanings
attached to women's biology. These social meanings connect women's biology
to the roles American society has imposed on women. Throughout American
history, women's inequality and subordination have rested on assumptions
about the limitations and differences posed by women's reproductive
capacity. 7 By constructing women's reproductive biology as a limitation on
the roles women may play, American society has endowed the physical facts
of reproductive biology with social meaning. 8
Any understanding of stereotyping must recognize the connection between
women's traditional roles and their reproductive capacity. Judgments about
women's reproductive differences from men are not simply judgments about
physical facts implying nothing about women's social roles. Stereotyping
cannot be understood solely as a failure to recognize similarities between men
and women. Indeed, the statutory restrictions upheld in Bradwell and other
discriminatory decisions were rooted in stereotypical assumptions about
women's roles based on their biological differences from men. 9 "Judgments
about women's capacity to bear children play a key role in social definitions
of gender roles and thus in the social logic of 'discrimination based on gender
as such." '90
86. JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EvoLurTIoN OF NATIONAL POuCY,
1800-1900, at 169 (1978); see also Siegel. supra note 15. at 280-323 (analyzing 19th-century anti-abortion
campaigns); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography.
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLtJM. L REV. 1, 36 & n.134 (1992) (arguing that history of aboruon
restrictions is "closely tied up with ... traditional ideas about women's proper role"). Dr. Montrose Pallcn
illustrated this point very clearly, linking abortion to the early women's rights movement. The ideas of the
19th-century feminist movement, he complained, had "the tendency to force women into men's places" and
was creating "new ideas of women's duties" convincing women that their "ministrations ... as ..
mother[s] should be abandoned for the sterner rights of voting and law making." Montrose A. Pallen.
Foeticide, or Criminal Abortion, 3 MED. ARCHIVES 193. 205 (1869). quoted in MOHR. supra. at 105.
87. See Law, supra note 30, at 957.
88. Cf. Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 159 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) ("'Wlomen's biology and ability
to bear children have been used as a basis for discrimination against them. This discrmination has had a
devastating effect upon women." (citations omitted)).
89. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra. 479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987) (rcognizng that
protective labor legislation of early 20th century reflected "stereotypical notions about pregnancy and the
abilities of pregnant workers").
90. Siegel, supra note 15, at 269.
1995] 1891
The Yale Law Journal
The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence has, in fact,
recognized the lessons of this history, but only in part. The Court has
invalidated legislation based on the stereotype that women are "child-
rearers," 91 not breadwinners, or on the assumption that women are "destined
solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only [men] for the
marketplace and the world of ideas"-----stereotypes rooted in understandings
about women's reproductive biology. The Court, however, has not fully
rejected the errors of Bradwell and Muller. It has scrutinized legislation to root
out these stereotypes only in cases where the state fails to recognize the
similarities between men and women, not where there are categorical
differences between the sexes. The lessons of this history go deeper than the
Court has recognized. The Court must consider how society constructs
women's biological differences from men in all cases, not simply in those
where men and women are similarly situated.
B. Learning the Lessons
Despite Geduldig and its progeny, outside the context of the Equal
Protection Clause the Supreme Court has recently begun to realize that sex
equality is not accomplished simply by recognizing the similarities between
men and women, and that state regulation of women's reproductive lives can
perpetuate stereotypical notions of women's proper roles. In so doing, the
Court has taken a broader view of the wrongs of its earlier sex discrimination
jurisprudence, recognizing that Bradwell and Muller erred by failing to
recognize the harm of constructing women's childbearing capacity as a duty
limiting their freedom to be full and equal citizens in the world of work and
ideas.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,93 the Supreme Court fused equality
themes into its privacy jurisprudence. In reaffirming the Constitution's
protection of reproductive freedom, the Court recognized that restrictive
abortion laws are premised on a narrow vision of women's roles.94 As the
91. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
92. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
93. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
94. This was not the first time that the Supreme Court had discussed sex equality in its privacy
jurisprudence. Six years earlier, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986), the Court recognized that the right of privacy "extends to women as well as men" and
that the Constitution protects the right to choose abortion because "[a]ny other result ... would protect
inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all." Id. at 772. Tho
Court in Thornburgh fused equality and privacy based on an ideal of equal liberty, not on a stereotyping
analysis. There are, however, deep connections between the two. The Court's protection of women's and
men's equal liberty to make decisions that are "basic to individual dignity and autonomy," id., ensures that
the state does not impose its own vision of the proper roles of women and men. Still, these connections
between equal liberty and stereotyping analysis went unexplored in Thornburgh. It is only in Casey that
the Court focuses on stereotyping and equality in the abortion context.
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joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, explained, states may not ban abortions
because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a
child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to
pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the
beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride
that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond
of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the
sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to
insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history
and culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large
extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her
place in society.95
In its analysis of the challenged provisions, the joint opinion pointed to
stereotypical reasoning in the husband-notification statute in concluding that
the statute imposed an undue burden on a woman's right of reproductive
choice. In invalidating the provision, the Court emphasized that the
Constitution forbids state legislation that rests on the assumption that the
husband is the head and master of the family. "A State may not give to a man
the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their
children. 96 By giving husbands a way to compel their wives to bear children
for them, the state had sought to embody into law "the common-law status of
married women [that is] repugnant to our present understanding of marriage
and of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution."97
Significantly, the joint opinion rejected the husband-notification statute's
underlying assumptions about women's roles, pointing out that such notions
about women's roles "precluded [women's] full and independent legal status
under the Constitution."98 The joint opinion linked the statute's assumptions
about women's roles to the stereotypical notions about women's role as mother
and their place in the home, ratified in cases like Bradwell and Hoyt.99 By
granting husbands the power to force their wives to bear children for them, the
Pennsylvania law embodied the view that a woman's role was to bear and raise
children for her husband, just as the statutes upheld in Bradwell and Hoyt
95. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807. Later in the joint opinion, the three Justices once again linked restrictive
abortion laws to narrow, stereotypical notions of women's proper roles. In its discussion of stare decisms
the joint opinion explicitly recognized the link between women's reproductive freedom and women's equal
citizenship: "The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives." Id. at 2809.
96. Id. at 2831.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2830.
99. See it at 2830-31.
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rested on the notion that women should be at home, not practicing law or
serving on juries.'00
Yet the Court did not even mention the Equal Protection Clause in its
Casey decision. Rather, it incorporated equality analysis into its discussion of
the right to privacy, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Only Justice Blackmun also located his argument within the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Like the authors of the
joint opinion, Justice Blackmun focused on the stereotypical assumptions
animating restrictions on abortion and the notions about women's proper roles
underlying them. By restricting women's access to abortion, Justice Blackmun
wrote, the state
assumes that [women] owe ... [a] duty [to bear children] as a matter
of course. This assumption-that women can simply be forced to
accept the "natural" status and incidents of motherhood appears to rest
upon a conception of women's role that has triggered the protection
of the Equal Protection Clause.'
Similarly, in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,102 the
Supreme Court examined the social meanings tied to a woman's ability to
become pregnant as it invalidated an employer's fetal-protection policy under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court recognized that American
society has excluded women from the world of work and ideas based on their
capacity to become pregnant. As Justice Blackmun noted, "Concern for a
woman's existing or potential offspring historically has been the excuse for
denying women equal employment opportunities."' 3  In finding
discriminatory the exclusion of all women of childbearing capacity from lead-
exposed jobs, the Court pointed out that the employer had stereotyped "all its
female employees as potentially pregnant; that choice evinces discrimination
on the basis of sex."'' " The Court refused to perpetuate stereotypical notions
about the limitations posed by the capacity to become pregnant, making clear
that "[i]t is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual
employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is more important
to herself and her family than her economic role."'0"
In Casey and Johnson Controls, we see a new conception of stereotyping.
That conception is simply not compatible with the view of the plurality in
Michael M. that stereotypes consist of "'overbroad generalizations based on
100. See discussion supra notes 79-80, 84 and accompanying text.
101. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2847 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
103. Id. at 211 (citing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)).
104. Id. at 199.
105. Id. at 211.
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sex which are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and
women.'""' ° The fact that men and women are not similarly situated with
respect to reproduction is not decisive. Even where there are no similarly
situated men to serve as a comparison, the state can perpetuate stereotypical
visions of women's proper roles. This understanding of stereotyping is
consistent with the definition used in the psychological literature.
In Casey, as in Johnson Controls, the Court gave a serious look to the
social meaning of compelled motherhood in determining women's lives as
citizens in American society. We see the focus on social meaning in the Casey
joint opinion's discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of laws
banning abortions. The joint opinion did not look to whether the state failed
to recognize the similarities between men and women, but to how "our history
and our culture" have shaped our understandings of women's bodies and the
jobs women should perform in society.' 7
The Casey joint opinion recognized that abortion bans force women to be
mothers, causing them suffering and limiting their choice of social roles. It
realized the constitutional harm of this act of state coercion. At the same time,
the joint opinion did not make clear whether the constitutional violation is tied
to the fact that the abortion decision is "intimate and personal," or whether it
rests on a broader understanding of the harms of forcing a woman into a
constricted social role, preventing her from realizing her "own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society. '
Despite the Casey joint opinion's strong statements about women's
equality, the joint opinion also gave states leeway in discouraging abortion and
encouraging women to bear children. The Court upheld, on the record before
it, counseling sessions and twenty-four-hour mandatory delay periods designed
to discourage women from choosing abortion.' 9 The Court did not perceive
the interest in discouraging abortion as an interest in forcing women to bear
children. It did not recognize in such regulations stereotypical assumptions
about women's obligations as mothers. Rather, the joint opinion described such
measures as benign, legitimate efforts to protect fetal life, efforts that express
nothing about women. Here, we see the same lack of understanding we saw
in Bray of the connection between the fetus and the pregnant woman."0
106. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464. 469 (1981) (plurality opinion) (quoting Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) (plurality opinion)).
107. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. CL 2791, 2807 (1992).
108. Id.
109. The Court, however, left open the possibility that future challenges to these types of provisions
might succeed if plaintiffs produced evidence showing that the laws imposed an undue burdcn on the right
to choose abortion. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909. 911 (Sourer. Circuit Justice 1994)
(denying stay of mandate pending petition for writ of certiorari); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer,
113 S. CL 1668. 1669 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of stay); Casey v. Planned Parenthood.
14 F.3d 848, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that future challenge to Pennsylvania statute upheld in Casey based
on different factual record "might yield a different result on its constitutionality).
110. See discussion supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
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Protecting fetuses is a benign act that has nothing to do with women and the
functions they play as American citizens."'
The Casey joint opinion's failure to reconcile its focus on stereotyping and
sex equality with its recognition of an interest in protecting fetal life is a
serious flaw in the joint opinion's analysis. By presenting the interest in
potential life as an abstract, acontextual interest, the Court distinguished the
interest in fetal life from attempts to control women's bodies. Yet, by refusing
to examine the specific contexts in which the state seeks to protect potential
life and the means it uses to do so, the Court failed to recognize the ways in
which the state's interest in fetal life is inextricably linked to the interest in
enforcing women's roles as mothers. Careful scrutiny of the contexts in which
the state asserts an interest in protecting fetal life and the means it uses to
effectuate that interest can reveal stereotypical reasoning about women's role
as mother.12 The state raises the interest in fetal life primarily in the
abortion context, forcing women to bear children and ensuring that they do not
violate social understandings of their proper roles. In other contexts, where
assumptions about women's proper roles are not central, the state often does
not intervene to protect fetal life. This selectivity of regulation powerfully
illustrates how the state's interest in fetal life is connected with assumptions
about women's duty to bear children." 3
Once we understand that stereotyping cannot be limited to cases where the
state fails to recognize similarities between men and women, it should be
apparent that the structure of sex discrimination law has serious flaws. Casey
illustrates these flaws. Under current doctrine, a statute premised on the notion
that women's biological differences mandate a narrow range of social roles for
women will receive almost no scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. As
a result of the Court's narrow definition of a sex-based classification, the
husband-notification provision in Casey, if reviewed on equal protection
grounds, would be subject to the lowest level of scrutiny." 4 Yet, as the
Casey joint opinion illustrates, this statute raises serious sex-equality concerns.
Despite the significant implications for women's equality raised by the
husband-notification provision, current equal protection doctrine would prevent
a court from scrutinizing this provision to ensure that the state had offered
weighty justifications for its treatment of married women seeking abortions.
11l. The undue burden analysis does not really appear to be the basis for the joint opinion's different
responses to the husband-notification and waiting period statutes. The evidence before the Court showed
that the mandatory delay imposed severe obstacles, and the joint opinion's dismissal of this evidence was
quite unconvincing. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825. Stereotyping analysis, however, does explain the
different outcomes in Casey. Because the joint opinion did not find that the waiting period was based on
stereotypes, it did not find any undue burden.
112. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 363-67.
113. Id. at 365-66; see infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
114. See SUNSrEIN, supra note 6. at 284 (noting that restrictive abortion laws do not violate Equal
Protection Clause under current doctrine "because only women can become pregnant").
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The Casey joint opinion sidestepped this problem by relying on the right to
privacy. In other equal protection cases, however, where no other source of
constitutional protection is available, the limitations of sex discrimination law
will perpetuate sex inequality.
If, as the Supreme Court's case law suggests, a central purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause is to forbid states from enacting legislation based on
stereotypes about women's proper roles, then the doctrinal structure of sex
discrimination law under the Equal Protection Clause must change, especially
our current understanding of what constitutes a sex-based classification. The
Casey Court's focus on stereotyping suggests that stereotyping analysis
provides an approach for doctrinal reform. We need to create a doctrinal
structure that permits inquiry into stereotyping where there are sex differences
between men and women. Sole reliance on the notions of sameness and
difference that we see in Geduldig and Cohen must give way to a new
definition of sex-based classifications. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit explained in construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
"Discrimination is not to be tolerated under the guise of physical properties
possessed by one sex."
'" 5
In determining whether a statute creates a sex-based classification, courts
should consider whether the statute rests on stereotypical notions of women's
proper roles. Currently, courts conduct this inquiry in assessing the validity of
the state's justifications for sex-based classifications. Absent a broader
definition of sex-based classifications, however, constitutional doctrine does not
permit courts to scrutinize statutes premised on stereotypical notions about the
limitations posed by women's biological differences from men.
If stereotyping were relevant to the finding of a sex-based classification,
courts could carefully scrutinize statutes to ensure that they did not rest on
stereotypes about women's biological differences. In her brief in Struck v.
Secretary of Defense,"6 Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued for this reconceptuali-
zation of sex discrimination law. She argued that "[s]ex discrimination exists
when all or a defined class of women (or men) are subjected to disadvantaged
treatment based on stereotypical assumptions that operate to foreclose
opportunity based on individual merit."'"17 This standard provides an excellent
way of escaping the Supreme Court's narrow understanding of what constitutes
a sex-based classification. It allows plaintiffs to show that the challenged
policy rests on stereotypes of women's or men's roles without the necessity of
115. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 P.2d 1194. 1198 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971). Indeed, this is the central principle animating Congress' passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). For a discussion of this law, see International Union. UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198-99, 204-06. 211 (1991).
116. 409 U.S. 1071 (1972). Struck involved a constitutional challenge to Air Force regulations
requiring the discharge of pregnant officers from the Air Force. For a recent discussion of Struck. see
Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1200-02.
117. Brief of Petitioners at 15, Struck, 409 U.S. 1071 (No. 72.178).
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pointing to a similarly situated male (or female) facing different treatment. It
also retains the focus on stereotyping that is the central principle of sex
discrimination law under the Equal Protection Clause.
Despite the Court's condemnation of stereotyping in its equal protection
cases and the precedent for stereotyping analysis in the Casey joint opinion,
scholars have not attempted to critique the flaws in current doctrine by
constructing a model of equal protection that truly follows the logic of the
Court's stereotyping principle. Sylvia Law has come closest to making the
stereotyping inquiry a trigger for heightened scrutiny, calling for a standard
that "distinguishes between reproductive biological difference and cultural
generalizations and that prohibits regulation of reproductive biology whenever
it oppresses women or reinforces cultural sex-role stereotypes.""' 8 Professor
Law, however, does not examine the centrality of stereotyping analysis to
arguments urging courts to scrutinize statutes for stereotypical reasoning in
areas of categorical sex differences. In formulating a model of equal protection,
she does not try to show what equal protection law would look like if the
Court took its stereotyping analysis seriously. Indeed, she provides little
discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions invalidating statutes based on
stereotypical notions of women's roles.
Rather than working within existing equal protection doctrine, Professor
Law bases her analysis on a modified version of Catharine MacKinnon's
antisubordination analysis, which demands that courts scrutinize laws that
oppress women."t9 Law's central concern is with the impact of statutes on
women. 2 The Supreme Court, however, has consistently rejected the notion
that if a law has an oppressive impact on women, it should be subject to
heightened scrutiny. 21 Rather, the Court's doctrinal analysis, sounding in
antidiscrimination norms, has focused on the purpose and structure of
challenged legislation, on ensuring that the reasoning of state actors is not
motivated by stereotypical judgments about women. 22 The stereotyping
analysis, unlike Law's antisubordination analysis, fits comfortably within this
focus on the reasoning of government officials."
At the same time, stereotyping analysis, as Law recognizes, is clearly
rooted in antisubordination values. The Supreme Court scrutinizes the use of
stereotypes about the proper roles of women and not about other types of
118. Law, supra note 30, at 1033.
119. Id. at 1005-13.
120. Id. at 1007-08.
121. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753,760 (1993) (rejecting proposition
that "class-based animus can be determined solely by effect"); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
271-80 (1979) (rejecting constitutional challenge to veterans statute granting preference to class that was
over 98% male); cf. West, supra note 52, at 61 n.66 (noting that most serious problem with
antisubordination approaches to Equal Protection Clause is that courts have rejected them).
122. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 353.
123. Indeed, Law's focus on the oppressive impact of a statute is in some ways inconsistent with her
use of stereotyping analysis, which is concerned with the reasoning of governmental decision makers.
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overbroad generalizations precisely because stereotypes about women's proper
roles are inextricably linked to the subordination of women. 12' But while the
focus on stereotypical judgments about women's and men's proper roles
reflects concerns about the subordination of women, equal protection doctrine
does not target the subordination of women per se. Instead, equal protection
law requires courts to scrutinize the types of judgments made by government
decision makers, reflecting the notion that certain types of judgments about
women's and men's roles in society "suggest[] the kind of 'class or caste'
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish."'"5
From a strategic standpoint, given the Supreme Court's current
unwillingness to focus equal protection analysis on a law's impact on women,
urging the Court to follow the logic of its stereotyping analysis seems like a
more effective path for doctrinal change than Law's antisubordination
approach. Indeed, by illustrating the problems inherent in the Court's current
definition of stereotyping, Casey provides support for this approach.
Finally, there is a deep tension between Professor Law's focus on
antisubordination and her stereotyping analysis. In applying her
antisubordination analysis to restrictions on access to abortion, she treats
pregnancy as a mere physical condition, replicating the formal analysis of
pregnancy we saw in Geduldig, Cohen, and Bray. She argues that restrictive
abortion laws oppress women because forced pregnancy imposes physical
intrusions on women's bodies and prevents women from taking part in the
world of work and public life.' 26 Her analysis looks at pregnancy as a
physical condition, not as a socially constructed limitation on women's roles.
She does not consider restrictive abortion laws to be based on stereotypes of
women's roles; she only considers them oppressive to women. Elsewhere, she
also seems to be working within a physiological framework, pointing out that
stereotyping is not possible where laws "are tied precisely to the biological fact
of pregnancy."'
' 27
Rather than work within this physiological conception, equal protection
doctrine needs to free itself from the sameness/difference framework that it
currently embraces. While Professor Law tries to reject this framework, she
incorporates it into parts of her sex equality analysis by replicating Geduldig's
vision of pregnancy as a physical condition. By using instead the Court's focus
on stereotyping analysis, begun in cases like Hogan and continued in Casey,
with its emphasis on the social construction of women's roles, we can develop
a model of equal protection analysis free from the focus on sameness and
difference.
124. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
125. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982).
126. See Law, supra note 30, at 1017.
127. Id. at 1031.
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IV. RETHINKING STEREOTYPING AND DIFFERENCE: SOME APPLICATIONS
How should courts apply the approach proposed in this Note to the laws
excluding pregnancy-related disability benefits upheld in Geduldig, the forced
pregnancy leave policy upheld in Cohen, and the abortion restrictions upheld
in Casey, such as the twenty-four-hour mandatory delay provision?
First, courts should evaluate the laws to see whether they rest on
stereotypical assumptions about women's proper roles. Both the exclusion of
pregnancy-related disability benefits at issue in Geduldig and the forced
maternity leave policy of Cohen rest, as Reva Siegel has recognized, on the
"social judgment that pregnancy is incommensurate with employment,
graphically illustrating the use of public power to transform the physiological
act of gestation into a gendered condition of economic dependency.'
1 28
Rather than regarding women as important members of the workforce, these
discriminatory measures depend on the assumption that pregnant women are
only marginal members of the workforce and should have men in their lives
who can take care of them while they are pregnant.'29 Men, as in other areas
of civic life, are the norm. As Martha Minow has pointed out,
Only from a point of view that regards pregnancy as a strange
occurrence, rather than an ongoing bodily potential, would its
relationship to female experience be made so tenuous; and only from
a vantage point that regards men as the norm would the [policies]
seem unproblematic and free from gender discrimination. 30
In addition, the lower court in Geduldig recognized that the denial of
benefits seemed to have roots in another stereotypical judgment: "the belief
that all pregnant women are incapable of work for long periods of time.'I
The court focused not on the underlying assumption that women are marginal
members of the workforce, but on the state's assumptions that pregnant
women's "'delicate condition"' and the inability to work that flows from this
condition would lead them to submit large claims.'32 To prevent aily
128. Siegel, supra note 15, at 268; see also Olga Popov, Note, Towards a Theory of Underclass
Review, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1095, 1123-24 (1991) ("The denial of benefits is related to the stereotype of a
male norm in the workplace, in that it reflects the notion that professional people do not-or should
not-get pregnant.").
129. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court invalidated statutes based on similar stereotypical
notions about women's role in the workforce. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975).
130. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW
57 (1990).
131. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (three-judge court), rev'd sub nont.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
132. Aiello, 359 F. Supp. at 799.
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stereotypical reasoning, the court held, "each pregnant woman [must] be
considered individually."'
' 33
Likewise, the mandatory leave policy upheld in Cohen rests on the
assumption that all pregnant women are fragile reproductive vessels who
cannot work into the third trimester of pregnancy and must rest for long
periods of time. In reviewing the court of appeals' ruling in Cohen, the
Supreme Court did not resolve the case on equal protection grounds, but rather
found that the statute violated due process protections for procreative freedom
by creating an irrebuttable presumption of a pregnant woman's inability to
work. In effect, the Court recognized that pregnancy had to be treated
individually, not in a stereotypical fashion.' Under the Due Process Clause,
the Court held, states could not make stereotypical assumptions about pregnant
women's ability to work.
Yet, by basing its decision on the Due Process Clause, the Court left itself
open to then Justice Rehnquist's argument that the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine was an "attack upon the very notion of lawmaking itself."' 35
Stereotyping analysis offers a powerful response to Justice Rehnquist's
argument: The legislature may not rely on generalizations concerning pregnant
women's ability to work because such generalizations reflect stereotypes that
have been used to subordinate women. Unlike most legislative generalizations,
generalizations concerning the roles and abilities of women receive special
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. This line of reasoning does not
challenge the general lawmaking power of the state.
At the core of the stereotypical reasoning behind the mandatory maternity
leave policy is not only a descriptive claim about pregnant women's
contributions to the workforce, but also a normative judgment that women
should be at home preparing to become mothers and taking care of their
newborn children, instead of participating in the world of work and ideas.
Unlike women who become mothers, men who become fathers are not required
to stop working to help care for newborn children. The required leave policy
thus rests on the assumption that "responsibility for children disable[s] female
parents, but not male parents, for other work-not for biological reasons, but
because society had ordered things that way."'
136
In evaluating the denial of pregnancy-related disability benefits and the
forced maternity leave policy, courts should apply heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause. The policies target only women and rest on
stereotypical assumptions of women's roles in society, constituting sex-based
classifications. Having determined that heightened scrutiny should be applied,
133. Id.
134. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974); O'Connor, supra note 54. at
1554-55.
135. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. See Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1202.
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courts should use the well-established intermediate scrutiny standard of Craig
v. Boren, considering whether the laws "serve important governmental
objectives and [are] substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.' 37
The twenty-four-hour waiting period upheld in Casey presents a slightly
more difficult case. The waiting period statute in Casey required a woman to
wait twenty-four hours between deciding to undergo and undergoing the
procedure. This provision required a woman to make two trips to the abortion
clinic before obtaining an abortion, first to obtain the state-approved
information discouraging abortion and then, at least twenty-four hours later, to
obtain the abortion. The mandatory delay provision should receive heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because it reflects the assumption
that a woman's proper role is to be a mother and that she must be required to
rethink any decision to forgo that role. The statute fundamentally perpetuates
the stereotypical notion of the indecisiveness of women, questioning a
woman's ability to make decisions about the course of her life.'38
A mandatory delay requirement seems reasonable at first blush in the
abortion context because of the serious nature of the abortion decision and,
more significant, because of stereotypical assumptions that women choose to
obtain abortions carelessly, without thinking through the implications of their
decisions. In Doe v. Bolton,139 Justice White characterized a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy as based on "convenience, whim, or
caprice."14 The same distrust of the decision-making capacity of women
seeking abortions continues into the present day. Just last year, during the
debate over the inclusion of abortion services in the national health care reform
package, Representative Richard Armey argued that providing abortion services
in the national health care package would "'condone the self-indulgent conduct
137. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
138. See Popov, supra note 128, at 1130. Throughout history, men have denigrated women's decision-
making capabilities, labeling them as careless and indecisive. See Brief Amici Curiae of the Committee for
Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse et al. at 37 n.15, Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506
(1983) (Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, 81-1255, & 81-1623) ("Virgil tells us 'A woman is always a fickle,
unstable thing.' Francis I of France explains, 'Woman often changes; foolish the man who trusts her.' The
poet, Aaron Hill says, 'First, then, a woman will or won't, depend on it.' Alexander Pope opinioncd,
'Women's at best a contradiction still."' (citations omitted)).
139. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
140. Id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting). Indeed, distrust of women seeking abortions is a common
theme. Horatio Storer, one of the leaders in the campaign to criminalize abortion in the 19th century, made
clear that women could not make decisions for themselves in the area of reproduction:
If each woman were allowed to judge for herself in this matter, her decision upon the abstract
would be too sure to be warped by personal considerations, and those of the moment. Women's
mind is prone to depression, and, indeed, to temporary actual derangement, under the stimulus
of uterine excitation, and this alike at the time of puberty and the final cessation of menses, at
the monthly period and at conception, during pregnancy, at labor, and during lactation ....
During the state of gestation the woman is therefore liable to thoughts, convictions even, that
at other times she would turn from in disgust or dismay ....
HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN 74-75 (Boston, Lee & Shepard
1866).
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of the body of a woman who has already demonstrated' that she was 'damned




In Casey, in line with these stereotypical judgments, the Court upheld
Pennsylvania's mandatory delay period as a "reasonable measure to implement
the State's interest in protecting the life of the unborn," finding that "important
decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some period of
reflection."'' 42 Yet, the state requires a woman to rethink her medical choices
only when the choice is to have an abortion. If a woman comes to an abortion
clinic and tells the clinic staff that she wants to carry her child to term, the
state does not force the woman to return home and rethink her decision. Nor,
for example, does the state require a person seeking a triple bypass operation,
unquestionably an important decision, to wait a fixed time period to think
about his or her decision once it has been made. The state does not require an
individual to rethink these important decisions because, unlike in the abortion
context, it makes no stereotypical judgment about the decision-making
capabilities of the concerned individual.
Thus, the waiting period law cannot simply represent a decision to ensure
that women make thoughtful decisions concerning important matters. If a
mandatory delay period were the norm in medical decision making, it might
be possible to see the Pennsylvania law as a reasonable requirement. Because
the state asserts an interest in making people rethink important decisions about
their lives only in the abortion context, it is highly doubtful that the statute is
necessary for informed decision making. 43 Rather, as Justice Stevens pointed
out in his separate opinion in Casey, the mandatory delay provision "rest[s] on
outmoded and unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmaking capacity of
women."'
144
The dissenters in Casey, while partially correct, failed to recognize the
incompleteness of this description of the stereotypical reasoning embodied in
the Pennsylvania statute. Neither Justice Stevens' nor Justice Blackmun's
stereotyping arguments confronted the state interest in protecting fetal life. As
a result, their arguments failed to recognize the ways in which the state interest
in protecting the fetus by forcing reconsideration of the abortion decision
141. Katharine Q. Seelye, Ascendance of an Improbable Leader-Richard Keith Armey. N.Y. ThiEs.
Dec. 6, 1994, at B9; see also Anna Quindlen, Not the Facts, Ma'am, N.Y. TIMEs. May 18. 1994. at A23
(criticizing Rep. Armey's speech stereotyping women seeking abortions as careless and unthinking).
142. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2825 (1992).
143. Cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038. 2044 (1994) (recognizing that exemptions from
government regulation may "diminish the credibility of the government's rationale" for regulating in first
place); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1990) (finding Minnesota's two-parent-notification
requirement for abortion unreasonable because few states, including Minnesota. require consent of both
parents for medical procedures to protect child's welfare).
144. Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2841-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id.
at 2851 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Justice Stevens' opinion
approvingly).
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merged into an attempt to force women to be mothers. 145 The statute
questions women's decision-making power insofar as women seek to free
themselves from the vision of women as mothers. If a woman does not want
to follow the role society has chosen for her, the state discourages that choice,
requiring her to make additional trips to the clinic, forcing her to pay for the
extra travel, and exposing her to further loss of confidentiality.
This becomes apparent when one compares the abortion context to other
procedures in which a woman's decision will affect the life of another. In other
matters of "life" and "death," the state does not second-guess a woman's
decision or require her to wait a specified time period before effectuating her
decision. For example, a pregnant woman may refuse medical treatment even
though the fetus will not survive without such treatment. "At the heart of that
situation, as with abortion, is a decision involving the life or death of the fetus.
Yet... [the woman] is considered competent to make one decision [without
a mandatory delay], but not the other."' 46 Unlike the decision to choose
abortion, these other decisions about the type of medical care she will use do
not implicate the state's vision of her proper social role. Such treatment may
have the effect of ending a pregnancy, but it is not the purpose of the
treatment to end a pregnancy. In the case of abortion, however, the state
requires a woman to rethink her decision because she is violating social
understandings of women's proper roles by using a treatment designed to end
her pregnancy. Only in this context, where assumptions about women's proper
roles are central, does the state allow fetal life to trump the rights of the
woman to make decisions about her medical care. Because of this basis in
stereotypes about women's proper roles, a court should subject mandatory
delay periods to heightened scrutiny.
Within this new framework, we may still conceptualize sex discrimination
law in terms of the comparison principle that is central to modem equal
protection law. While many scholars have attacked this focus on comparisons
as unhelpful in the context of reproductive regulation, 147 it is not necessary
to abandon the notion of comparing the law's treatment of men and
women. 48 A comparison principle need not perpetuate sex discrimination.
It need not grant women equality only insofar as they are like men. The
comparison principle, as applied by the Supreme Court, has these flaws
145. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 277, 357-59 (describing state's interest in fetal life as an interest
in forcing women to bear children).
146. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1199 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, CJ., concurring). Other examples might
include how the state treats a parent's decision to authorize removal of a child's life support system, See
id. at 1195 (majority opinion) (noting that unwed minor could authorize discontinuance of life support for
child in coma, but could not consent to abortion).
147. See, e.g., Law, supra note 30, at 1009; Wildman, supra note 47, at 267.
148. Indeed, as Kay notes, even equal protection analyses that focus on oppression, stigma, and sex
stereotyping, rather than on differential treatment, do not "eliminate the need for comparison." Kay, supra
note 48, at 87.
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because it compares men and women only on the level of physical similarities
between the sexes and does not compare how a law affects the ability of
women and men to be full citizens in American society.
At times, however, the Supreme Court has understood that courts can
structure comparisons in alternative ways, producing a different understanding
of equality. For example, in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra,49 the Court upheld under Title VII a California law requiring
employers to provide unpaid pregnancy disability leave to women workers and
to reinstate them following the leave. The Court found that Title VII did not
preempt the state statute because both sought to guarantee equality. In finding
the California law consistent with Title VII's goal of equal employment
opportunity, the Court explained that "[b]y 'taking pregnancy into account,'
California's pregnancy disability-leave statute allows women, as well as men,
to have families without losing their jobs."'"
If taking pregnancy into account is necessary to ensure that women, like
men, have the opportunity to keep their jobs while also being able to raise
their children, then the exclusion of pregnancy-related disability benefits
upheld in Geduldig necessarily works an inequality for women. It prevents
women from being workers and mothers at the same time, requiring them to
leave their jobs and perpetuating the notion that women's role is as mother, not
worker.'
The Court's comparison does not focus on any physical similarities
between the sexes. Rather than asking whether men and women are similar
with respect to pregnancy, Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court
"shifted ... to a broader comparison of men and women in their dual roles as
workers and as family members."' The Court's focus on whether women
and men have multiple roles in the areas of home and work allows for a
comparison principle that can be used to recognize and prevent the
subordination of women based on their differences from men. Justice Marshall
made the norm a female one, "us[ing] women's experiences as the benchmark
and call[ing] for treating men equally in reference to women, thus reversing
the usual practice."'
' 53
Yet, rather than simply using a female baseline for comparing the sexes
in all cases, courts should ensure that women, like men, are full and equal
citizens in American society, preventing the state from imposing its vision of
149. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
150. Id. at 289.
151. See TRIBE, supra note 74, § 16-29, at 1584 ("The proper comparison in Geduldig. therefore, was
not between pregnant women and all other nonpregnant workers, but between female employees who had
engaged in reproductive behavior and male workers who had done likewise. If no man loses his job...
as a result of this activity, neither should any woman.").
152. MINoW, supra note 130, at 58.
153. Id. at 59.
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the proper roles for each sex."5 This is the approach Justice Marshall used
in Guerra. If we locate the comparison on the level of social roles, we can
also deal with the few cases where men are treated unequally based on their
physical sex characteristics."'5 Most important, where women plaintiffs claim
that the state is subjecting them to unequal treatment based on their biological
differences, we must use a baseline that does not seize on those differences as
a reason for rejecting their claim.
V. CONCLUSION
Stereotyping analysis presents a powerful way to attack sex discrimination.
Given the long history of using stereotypes to confine women to certain places
in society, an equal protection doctrine that focuses on stereotyping can be a
strong tool for litigants challenging sex discrimination. In several cases,
however, the Supreme Court has stripped the stereotyping inquiry of any force,
limiting it to cases in which the state fails to recognize similarities between
men and women. This approach has legitimated, in ways that have great force
in modem America, stereotypical notions about women's reproductive capacity.
The challenge is to create a doctrine that grants women equality as women, not
solely as they are like men. The Court's decision in Casey provides us with an
excellent opportunity to decenter sex discrimination law, challenging the
assumptions about sameness and difference that have been central aspects of
the Court's understanding of the Equal Protection Clause. Stereotyping
analysis, properly understood, provides a way to mount this challenge from
within the framework that the Supreme Court has applied since it began to
scrutinize sex-based laws.
154. See Kay, supra note 48, at 87 ("Women and men are alike in many ways, including the largely
untested capacity to develop their own potential free of sex stereotypes.").
155. ld. at 85 & nn. 340-41. Indeed, Kay points out the ways in which states used rape laws to control
African-American men. This case, of course, implicates both racial and sex-based stereotypes. For a
discussion of the intersection of race and gender, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and AntiraelSt
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F 139.
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